Distinguish perceptual consciousness from dreams in terms of informativeness within IIT

Determine, within the Integrated Information Theory framework that prioritizes intrinsic integrated information, how to distinguish perceptual conscious experiences from dream experiences in terms of informativeness, accounting for why perceptual experiences appear more informative despite IIT’s de-emphasis on environmental information.

Background

IIT links the specificity of phenomenal content to intrinsic information (ii) within the physical substrate of consciousness, deeming environmental input-output relations extrinsic and therefore not directly relevant to conscious content. This stance creates tension when explaining why perceptual experiences typically seem more informative than dream imagery.

The authors argue that without appealing to environmental inputs, it is unclear how IIT can differentiate the informativeness of perception versus dreams. Resolving this would clarify how differences in experience types are reflected in intrinsic causal structures or other IIT-sanctioned quantities.