Game-theoretic modeling of pheromone-laying ants

Determine whether pheromone-laying ant species that use pheromone trails during nest relocation can be effectively modeled within a game-theoretic framework, possibly as a cooperative game in which decisions emerge at the colony level.

Background

This paper develops a game-theoretic model of decision-making during nest relocation in the tandem-running ant Diacamma indicum, which does not use pheromone trails. The observed behavior—returning leaders turning toward the new nest upon encountering a tandem pair on a narrow path—is explained via sampling equilibrium consistent with procedural rationality, rather than Nash equilibrium.

The authors note that their findings pertain to a non-pheromone-trail species and raise the question of whether similar game-theoretic approaches can capture the dynamics of pheromone-laying ants, where recruitment and movement are strongly influenced by colony-level trail information. They suggest that such cases may require cooperative game formulations reflecting colony-level decision emergence.