Computational Complexity of Approximate Nash Equilibrium in Large Games

Published 2 May 2014 in cs.GT | (1405.0524v3)

Abstract: We prove that finding an epsilon-Nash equilibrium in a succinctly representable game with many players is PPAD-hard for constant epsilon. Our proof uses succinct games, i.e. games whose payoff function is represented by a circuit. Our techniques build on a recent query complexity lower bound by Babichenko.

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Authors (1)

Aviad Rubinstein

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