Using Enthymemes to Fill the Gap between Logical Argumentation and Revision of Abstract Argumentation Frameworks

Abstract: In this paper, we present a preliminary work on an approach to fill the gap between logic-based argumentation and the numerous approaches to tackle the dynamics of abstract argumentation frameworks. Our idea is that, even when arguments and attacks are defined by means of a logical belief base, there may be some uncertainty about how accurate is the content of an argument, and so the presence (or absence) of attacks concerning it. We use enthymemes to illustrate this notion of uncertainty of arguments and attacks. Indeed, as argued in the literature, real arguments are often enthymemes instead of completely specified deductive arguments. This means that some parts of the pair (support, claim) may be missing because they are supposed to belong to some "common knowledge", and then should be deduced by the agent which receives the enthymeme. But the perception that agents have of the common knowledge may be wrong, and then a first agent may state an enthymeme that her opponent is not able to decode in an accurate way. It is likely that the decoding of the enthymeme by the agent leads to mistaken attacks between this new argument and the existing ones. In this case, the agent can receive some information about attacks or arguments acceptance statuses which disagree with her argumentation framework. We exemplify a way to incorporate this new piece of information by means of existing works on the dynamics of abstract argumentation frameworks.