Invincible Strategies of Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

Abstract: Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma(IPD) is a well-known benchmark for studying the long term behaviors of rational agents, such as how cooperation can emerge among selfish and unrelated agents that need to co-exist over long term. Many well-known strategies have been studied, from the simple tit-for-tat(TFT) strategy made famous by Axelrod after his influential tournaments to more involved ones like zero determinant strategies studied recently by Press and Dyson. In this paper, following Press and Dyson, we consider one memory probabilistic strategies. We consider that we call invincible strategies: a strategy is invincible if it never loses against any other strategy in terms of average payoff in the limit, if the limit exists. We show a strategy is invincible for infinite repeated iterated prisoner's dilemma.