Synthesis of Successful Actuator Attackers on Supervisors

Abstract: In this work, we propose and develop a new discrete-event based actuator attack model on the closed-loop system formed by the plant and the supervisor. We assume the actuator attacker partially observes the execution of the closed-loop system and eavesdrops the control commands issued by the supervisor. The attacker can modify each control command on a specified subset of attackable events. The attack principle of the actuator attacker is to remain covert until it can establish a successful attack and lead the attacked closed-loop system into generating certain damaging strings. We present a characterization for the existence of a successful attacker, via a new notion of attackability, and prove the existence of the supremal successful actuator attacker, when both the supervisor and the attacker are normal (that is, unobservable events to the supervisor cannot be disabled by the supervisor and unobservable events to the attacker cannot be attacked by the attacker). Finally, we present an algorithm to synthesize the supremal successful attackers that are represented by Moore automata.