No Adjective Ordering Mystery, and No Raven Paradox, Just an Ontological Mishap

Abstract: In the concluding remarks of Ontological Promiscuity Hobbs (1985) made what we believe to be a very insightful observation: given that semantics is an attempt at specifying the relation between language and the world, if "one can assume a theory of the world that is isomorphic to the way we talk about it ... then semantics becomes nearly trivial". But how exactly can we rectify our logical formalisms so that semantics, an endeavor that has occupied the most penetrating minds for over two centuries, can become (nearly) trivial, and what exactly does it mean to assume a theory of the world in our semantics? In this paper we hope to provide answers for both questions. First, we believe that a commonsense theory of the world can (and should) be embedded in our semantic formalisms resulting in a logical semantics grounded in commonsense metaphysics. Moreover, we believe the first step to accomplishing this vision is rectifying what we think was a crucial oversight in logical semantics, namely the failure to distinguish between two fundamentally different types of concepts: (i) ontological concepts, that correspond to what Cocchiarella (2001) calls first-intension concepts and are types in a strongly-typed ontology; and (ii) logical concepts (or second intension concepts), that are predicates corresponding to properties of (and relations between) objects of various ontological types1. In such a framework, which we will refer to henceforth by ontologik, it will be shown how type unification and other type operations can be used to account for the `missing text phenomenon' (MTP) (see Saba, 2019a) that is at the heart of most challenges in the semantics of natural language, by uncovering the significant amount of missing text that is never explicitly stated in everyday discourse, but is often implicitly assumed as shared background knowledge.