Saturating stable matchings

Published 11 Nov 2020 in cs.GT, econ.TH, and math.CO | (2011.06046v2)

Abstract: I relate bipartite graph matchings to stable matchings. I prove a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a saturating stable matching, where every agent on one side is matched, for all possible preferences. I extend my analysis to perfect stable matchings, where every agent on both sides is matched.

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Authors (1)

Muhammad Maaz

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