Incorporate Day-ahead Robustness and Real-time Incentives for Electricity Market Design

Abstract: In this paper, we propose a two-stage electricity market framework to explore the participation of distributed energy resources (DERs) in a day-ahead (DA) market and a real-time (RT) market. The objective is to determine the optimal bidding strategies of the aggregated DERs in the DA market and generate online incentive signals for DER-owners to optimize the social welfare taking into account network operational constraints. Distributionally robust optimization is used to explicitly incorporate data-based statistical information of renewable forecasts into the supply/demand decisions in the DA market. We evaluate the conservativeness of bidding strategies distinguished by different risk aversion settings. In the RT market, a bi-level time-varying optimization problem is proposed to design the online incentive signals to tradeoff the RT imbalance penalty for distribution system operators (DSOs) and the costs of individual DER-owners. This enables tracking their optimal dispatch to provide fast balancing services, in the presence of time-varying network states while satisfying the voltage regulation requirement. Simulation results on both DA wholesale market and RT balancing market demonstrate the necessity of this two-stage design, and its robustness to uncertainties, the performance of convergence, the tracking ability, and the feasibility of the resulting network operations.