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A Theory of Auditability for Allocation Mechanisms

Published 16 May 2023 in econ.TH | (2305.09314v3)

Abstract: In centralized mechanisms and platforms, participants do not fully observe each others' type reports. Hence, if there is a deviation from the promised mechanism, participants may be unable to detect it. We formalize a notion of auditabilty that captures how easy or hard it is to detect deviations from a mechanism. We find a stark contrast between the auditabilities of prominent mechanisms. We also provide tight characterizations of maximally auditable classes of allocation mechanisms.

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Authors (2)

  1. Aram Grigoryan 
  2. Markus Möller 

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