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On "Indifference" and Backward Induction in Games with Perfect Information
Published 8 Jul 2023 in cs.AI | (2307.04029v1)
Abstract: Indifference of a player with respect to two distinct outcomes of a game cannot be handled by small perturbations, because the actual choice may have significant impact on other players, and cause them to act in a way that has significant impact of the indifferent player. It is argued that ties among rational choices can be resolved by refinements of the concept of rationality based on the utilities of other players. One such refinement is the concept of Tit-for-Tat.
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