A non-parametric approach for estimating consumer valuation distributions using second price auctions

Abstract: We focus on online second price auctions, where bids are made sequentially, and the winning bidder pays the maximum of the second-highest bid and a seller specified reserve price. For many such auctions, the seller does not see all the bids or the total number of bidders accessing the auction, and only observes the current selling prices throughout the course of the auction. We develop a novel non-parametric approach to estimate the underlying consumer valuation distribution based on this data. Previous non-parametric approaches in the literature only use the final selling price and assume knowledge of the total number of bidders. The resulting estimate, in particular, can be used by the seller to compute the optimal profit-maximizing price for the product. Our approach is free of tuning parameters, and we demonstrate its computational and statistical efficiency in a variety of simulation settings, and also on an Xbox 7-day auction dataset on eBay.