Papers
Topics
Authors
Recent
Search
2000 character limit reached

Stability of P2P Networks Under Greedy Peering (Full Version)

Published 22 Feb 2024 in cs.GT and cs.NI | (2402.14666v1)

Abstract: Major cryptocurrency networks have relied on random peering choice rules for making connections in their peer-to-peer networks. Generally, these choices have good properties, particularly for open, permissionless networks. Random peering choices however do not take into account that some actors may choose to optimize who they connect to such that they are quicker to hear about information being propagated in the network. In this paper, we explore the dynamics of such greedy strategies. We study a model in which nodes select peers with the objective of minimizing their average distance to a designated subset of nodes in the network, and consider the impact of several factors including the peer selection process, degree constraints, and the size of the designated subset. The latter is particularly interesting in the context of blockchain networks as generally only a subset of nodes are the propagation source for content. We first analyze an idealized version of the game where each node has full knowledge of the current network and aims to select the $d$ best connections, and prove the existence of equilibria under various model assumptions. Since in reality nodes only have local knowledge based on their peers' behavior, we also study a greedy protocol which runs in rounds, with each node replacing its worst-performing edge with a new random edge. We exactly characterize stability properties of networks that evolve with this peering rule and derive regimes where stability is possible and even inevitable. We also run extensive simulations with this peering rule examining both how the network evolves and how different network parameters affect the stability properties of the network. Our findings generally show that the only stable networks that arise from greedy peering choices are low-diameter and result in disparate performance for nodes in the network.

Definition Search Book Streamline Icon: https://streamlinehq.com
References (35)
  1. Statistical mechanics of complex networks. Reviews of modern physics, 74(1):47, 2002.
  2. Overchain: Building a robust overlay with a blockchain. arXiv preprint arXiv:2201.12809, 2022.
  3. Strategic peer selection using transaction value and latency. In Proceedings of the 2022 ACM CCS Workshop on Decentralized Finance and Security, pages 9–14, 2022.
  4. A noncooperative model of network formation. Econometrica, 68(5):1181–1229, 2000.
  5. Bitcoin core 24.0.1. https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin, 2023.
  6. Today’s cryptocurrency prices by market cap. https://coinmarketcap.com/, 2023.
  7. The price of selfish behavior in bilateral network formation. In Proc. of PODC’05, pages 99–107, 2005.
  8. Txprobe: Discovering Bitcoin’s network topology using orphan transactions. In Financial Cryptography and Data Security: 23rd International Conference, FC 2019, Frigate Bay, St. Kitts and Nevis, February 18–22, 2019, Revised Selected Papers 23, pages 550–566. Springer, 2019.
  9. The price of anarchy in network creation games. ACM Trans. Algorithms, 8(2):1–13, 2012.
  10. devp2p. https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p, 2023.
  11. Survey on blockchain networking: Context, state-of-the-art, challenges. ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR), 54(5):1–34, 2021.
  12. IP geolocation database stability and implications for network research. In Network Traffic Measurement and Analysis Conference, 2021.
  13. Eclipse attacks on Bitcoin’s peer-to-peer network. In 24th {normal-{\{{USENIX}normal-}\}} Security Symposium ({normal-{\{{USENIX}normal-}\}} Security 15), pages 129–144, 2015.
  14. Eclipsing Ethereum peers with false friends. arXiv preprint arXiv:1908.10141, 2019.
  15. A strategic model of social and economic networks. Journal of Economic Theory, 71:44–74, 1996.
  16. Security of blockchains at capacity. arXiv preprint arXiv:2303.09113, 2023.
  17. Under the hood of the Ethereum gossip protocol. In International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security, pages 437–456. Springer, 2021.
  18. Bounded budget connection (BBC) games or how to make friends and influence people, on a budget. Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 80(7):1266–1284, 2014.
  19. Toposhot: uncovering Ethereum’s network topology leveraging replacement transactions. In Proceedings of the 21st ACM Internet Measurement Conference, pages 302–319, 2021.
  20. Lighthouse book: Advanced networking. https://lighthouse-book.sigmaprime.io/advanced_networking.html.
  21. Triangle inequality variations in the internet. In Proceedings of the 9th ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement, pages 177–183, 2009.
  22. Perigee: Efficient peer-to-peer network design for blockchains. In Proceedings of the 39th Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, pages 428–437, 2020.
  23. Low-resource eclipse attacks on Ethereum’s peer-to-peer network. Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2018.
  24. Network formation games with heterogeneous players and the internet structure. In Proceedings of the Fifteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC ’14, page 735–752, New York, NY, USA, 2014. Association for Computing Machinery.
  25. Discovering Bitcoin’s public topology and influential nodes. et al, 2015.
  26. Longest chain consensus under bandwidth constraint. In AFT. ACM, 2022.
  27. Etc node explorer. https://etcnodes.org/. Accessed on 08-08-2023.
  28. M.J. Osborne and A. Rubinstein. A Course in Game Theory. MIT Press, 1994.
  29. Nodes in the Bitcoin network: Comparative measurement study and survey. IEEE ACCESS, 7:57009–57022, 2019.
  30. IP geolocation databases: Unreliable? ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review, 41(2):53–56, 2011.
  31. Kadcast: A structured approach to broadcast in blockchain networks. In Proceedings of the 1st ACM Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies, pages 199–213, 2019.
  32. Strategic latency reduction in blockchain peer-to-peer networks. arXiv preprint arXiv:2205.06837, 2022.
  33. Comparative performance analysis of underlying network topologies for blockchain. In 2021 International Conference on Information Networking (ICOIN), pages 367–372. IEEE, 2021.
  34. Collective dynamics of ‘small-world’ networks. Nature, 393(6684):440–442, 1998.
  35. Jumpnet: Improving connectivity and robustness in unstructured P2P networks by randomness. Internet Mathematics, 5(3):227–250, 2008.

Summary

No one has generated a summary of this paper yet.

Sign Up to Summarize

Paper to Video (Beta)

No one has generated a video about this paper yet.

Sign Up to Generate All Videos Subscribe on YouTube

Whiteboard

No one has generated a whiteboard explanation for this paper yet.

Sign Up to Generate

Open Problems

We haven't generated a list of open problems mentioned in this paper yet.

Generate Now

Continue Learning

We haven't generated follow-up questions for this paper yet.

Generate Now

Collections

Sign up for free to add this paper to one or more collections.

Sign Up

Tweets

Sign up for free to view the 1 tweet with 0 likes about this paper.

Sign Up for Free