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Optimality of Decentralized Symmetric Policies for Stochastic Teams with Mean-Field Information Sharing

Published 7 Apr 2024 in math.OC | (2404.04957v2)

Abstract: We study a class of stochastic exchangeable teams comprising a finite number of decision makers (DMs) as well as their mean-field limits involving infinite numbers of DMs. In the finite population regime, we study exchangeable teams under the centralized information structure. For the infinite population setting, we study exchangeable teams under the decentralized mean-field information sharing. The paper makes the following main contributions: i) For finite population exchangeable teams, we establish the existence of a randomized optimal policy that is exchangeable (permutation invariant) and Markovian; ii) As our main result in the paper, we show that a sequence of exchangeable optimal policies for finite population settings converges to a conditionally symmetric (identical), independent, and decentralized randomized policy for the infinite population problem, which is globally optimal for the infinite population problem. This result establishes the existence of a symmetric, independent, decentralized optimal randomized policy for the infinite population problem. Additionally, this proves the optimality of the limiting measure-valued MDP for the representative DM; iii) Finally, we show that symmetric, independent, decentralized optimal randomized policies are approximately optimal for the corresponding finite-population team with a large number of DMs under the centralized information structure. Our paper thus establishes the relation between the controlled McKean-Vlasov dynamics and the optimal infinite population decentralized stochastic control problem (without an apriori restriction of symmetry in policies of individual agents), for the first time, to our knowledge.

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