Mechanisms for a dynamic many-to-many school choice problem

Abstract: We examine the problem of assigning teachers to public schools over time when teachers have tenured positions and can work simultaneously in multiple schools. To do this, we investigate a dynamic many-to-many school choice problem where public schools have priorities over teachers and teachers hold path-independent choice functions selecting subsets of schools. We introduce a new concept of dynamic stability that recognizes the tenured positions of teachers and we prove that a dynamically stable matching always exists. We propose the Tenure-Respecting Deferred Acceptance (TRDA) mechanism, which produces a dynamically stable matching that is constrained-efficient within the class of dynamically stable matchings and minimizes unjustified claims. To improve efficiency beyond this class, we also propose the Tenure-Respecting Efficiency-Adjusted Deferred Acceptance (TREADA) mechanism, an adaptation of the Efficiency-Adjusted Deferred Acceptance mechanism to our dynamic context. We demonstrate that the outcome of the TREADA mechanism Pareto-dominates any dynamically stable matching and achieves efficiency when all teachers consent. Additionally, we examine the issue of manipulability, showing that although the TRDA and TREADA mechanisms can be manipulated, they remain non-obviously dynamically manipulable under specific conditions on schools' priorities.