LLM Trading: Analysis of LLM Agent Behavior in Experimental Asset Markets

Abstract: This paper explores how LLMs behave in a classic experimental finance paradigm widely known for eliciting bubbles and crashes in human participants. We adapt an established trading design, where traders buy and sell a risky asset with a known fundamental value, and introduce several LLM-based agents, both in single-model markets (all traders are instances of the same LLM) and in mixed-model "battle royale" settings (multiple LLMs competing in the same market). Our findings reveal that LLMs generally exhibit a "textbook-rational" approach, pricing the asset near its fundamental value, and show only a muted tendency toward bubble formation. Further analyses indicate that LLM-based agents display less trading strategy variance in contrast to humans. Taken together, these results highlight the risk of relying on LLM-only data to replicate human-driven market phenomena, as key behavioral features, such as large emergent bubbles, were not robustly reproduced. While LLMs clearly possess the capacity for strategic decision-making, their relative consistency and rationality suggest that they do not accurately mimic human market dynamics.