Robust Eavesdropping in the Presence of Adversarial Communications for RF Fingerprinting

Abstract: Deep learning is an effective approach for performing radio frequency (RF) fingerprinting, which aims to identify the transmitter corresponding to received RF signals. However, beyond the intended receiver, malicious eavesdroppers can also intercept signals and attempt to fingerprint transmitters communicating over a wireless channel. Recent studies suggest that transmitters can counter such threats by embedding deep learning-based transferable adversarial attacks in their signals before transmission. In this work, we develop a time-frequency-based eavesdropper architecture that is capable of withstanding such transferable adversarial perturbations and thus able to perform effective RF fingerprinting. We theoretically demonstrate that adversarial perturbations injected by a transmitter are confined to specific time-frequency regions that are insignificant during inference, directly increasing fingerprinting accuracy on perturbed signals intercepted by the eavesdropper. Empirical evaluations on a real-world dataset validate our theoretical findings, showing that deep learning-based RF fingerprinting eavesdroppers can achieve classification performance comparable to the intended receiver, despite efforts made by the transmitter to deceive the eavesdropper. Our framework reveals that relying on transferable adversarial attacks may not be sufficient to prevent eavesdroppers from successfully fingerprinting transmissions in next-generation deep learning-based communications systems.