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General Training and Worker Motivation: Experimental Evidence on Discretionary Effort

Published 26 Mar 2025 in econ.GN and q-fin.EC | (2503.20560v1)

Abstract: This study investigates the reaction of workers to employer-sponsored general training that provides skills useful not only in the incumbent employer but also in other firms in the industry. While previous research has focused primarily on workers' responses to wage renegotiation, our work extends this understanding by exploring an additional dimension -- workers' discretionary effort beyond their job duties, which is not verifiable. We conduct a laboratory experiment to observe workers' responses in such an effort to different training intensities. We find that workers generally increase their discretionary effort in response to general training, regardless of whether it is employer-sponsored or mandated. Moreover, the employer's intention behind offering training influences both effort and workers' renegotiation responses. Additionally, when workers can penalize employers, they do so, although higher employer-determined training intensities mitigate this behavior.

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