Heterogeneous Graph Backdoor Attack

Abstract: Heterogeneous Graph Neural Networks (HGNNs) excel in modeling complex, multi-typed relationships across diverse domains, yet their vulnerability to backdoor attacks remains unexplored. To address this gap, we conduct the first investigation into the susceptibility of HGNNs to existing graph backdoor attacks, revealing three critical issues: (1) high attack budget required for effective backdoor injection, (2) inefficient and unreliable backdoor activation, and (3) inaccurate attack effectiveness evaluation. To tackle these issues, we propose the Heterogeneous Graph Backdoor Attack (HGBA), the first backdoor attack specifically designed for HGNNs, introducing a novel relation-based trigger mechanism that establishes specific connections between a strategically selected trigger node and poisoned nodes via the backdoor metapath. HGBA achieves efficient and stealthy backdoor injection with minimal structural modifications and supports easy backdoor activation through two flexible strategies: Self-Node Attack and Indiscriminate Attack. Additionally, we improve the ASR measurement protocol, enabling a more accurate assessment of attack effectiveness. Extensive experiments demonstrate that HGBA far surpasses multiple state-of-the-art graph backdoor attacks in black-box settings, efficiently attacking HGNNs with low attack budgets. Ablation studies show that the strength of HBGA benefits from our trigger node selection method and backdoor metapath selection strategy. In addition, HGBA shows superior robustness against node feature perturbations and multiple types of existing graph backdoor defense mechanisms. Finally, extension experiments demonstrate that the relation-based trigger mechanism can effectively extend to tasks in homogeneous graph scenarios, thereby posing severe threats to broader security-critical domains.