Mapping Quantum Threats: An Engineering Inventory of Cryptographic Dependencies

Abstract: The emergence of large-scale quantum computers, powered by algorithms like Shor's and Grover's, poses an existential threat to modern public-key cryptography. This vulnerability stems from the ability of these machines to efficiently solve the hard mathematical problems - such as integer factorization and the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem - that underpin widely used cryptographic primitives. This includes RSA, Diffie-Hellman (DH), Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH), and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), which are foundational to security across the digital ecosystem. Once Shor's algorithm becomes practically realizable, these primitives will fail, undermining both retrospective confidentiality and cryptographic authenticity - enabling adversaries to decrypt previously captured communications and forge digital signatures. This paper presents a systematic inventory of technologies exposed to quantum threats from the engineering perspective, organized by both technology domain and by implementation environment. While prior research has emphasized theoretical breaks or protocol-level adaptations, this work focuses on the practical landscape - mapping quantum-vulnerable systems across diverse digital infrastructures. The contribution is a cross-domain, cross-environment threat map to guide practitioners, vendors, and policymakers in identifying exposed technologies before the arrival of cryptographically relevant quantum computers.