Grothendieck Topologies and Sheaf-Theoretic Foundations of Cryptographic Security: Attacker Models and $Σ$-Protocols as the First Step

Abstract: Cryptographic security is traditionally formulated using game-based or simulation-based definitions. In this paper, we propose a structural reformulation of cryptographic security based on Grothendieck topologies and sheaf theory. Our key idea is to model attacker observations as a Grothendieck site, where covering families represent admissible decompositions of partial information determined by efficient simulation. Within this framework, protocol transcripts naturally form sheaves, and security properties arise as geometric conditions. As a first step, we focus on $Σ$-protocols. We show that the transcript structure of any $Σ$-protocol defines a torsor in the associated topos of sheaves. Local triviality of this torsor corresponds to zero-knowledge, while the absence of global sections reflects soundness. A concrete analysis of the Schnorr $Σ$-protocol is provided to illustrate the construction. This sheaf-theoretic perspective offers a conceptual explanation of simulation-based security and suggests a geometric foundation for further cryptographic abstractions.