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Equilibria in Repeated Games with Countably Many Players and Tail-Measurable Payoffs

Published 7 Jun 2021 in math.OC and cs.GT | (2106.03975v1)

Abstract: We prove that every repeated game with countably many players, finite action sets, and tail-measurable payoffs admits an $\epsilon$-equilibrium, for every $\epsilon > 0$.

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