Noncooperative strategic interactions in delayed information systems

Characterize noncooperative dynamic games in delayed information systems—control systems in which decision-makers have access to delayed measurements or communications—by developing a rigorous framework to model these strategic interactions and determining the corresponding Nash equilibria under such delays.

Background

The paper situates its contribution within the literature on multi-controller cyber-physical systems, noting that most prior work on delayed information systems has focused on cooperative control, whereas many real-world scenarios involve strategic, self-interested agents. In dynamic games with asymmetric information, existing results emphasize general frameworks, and explicit equilibrium characterizations are scarce.

Within this context, the authors point out that research on delayed information systems has largely remained on the cooperative side, explicitly identifying the gap concerning noncooperative strategic interactions. The paper addresses a specific two-player linear time-invariant setting with one-step delayed measurements and asymmetric information, but the broader challenge of characterizing noncooperative interactions in delayed information systems remains identified as open.