Strategic feedback in recommender–receiver environments

Investigate the problem-solving and experimentation framework when the environment strategically responds to the solver’s actions by incorporating a recommender–receiver interaction, and ascertain how such strategic responses by receivers affect the recommender’s exploration–exploitation tradeoff.

Background

The paper analyzes a single-agent problem and a principal–agent contracting environment where the information structure is determined by the agent’s exploration choices and difficulty is exogenous. It suggests considering settings where the environment responds strategically to the solver’s actions.

In recommendation contexts, a receiver’s decision to follow advice feeds back into the information the recommender acquires. Understanding these strategic feedback loops requires integrating behavioral responses into the information arrival process and characterizing the resulting exploration–exploitation dynamics.

References

Several avenues for future research remain open. Finally, incorporating strategic feedback would allow the problem environment itself to respond to the solver’s actions. For example, strategic decisions by a receiver on whether to follow recommendations would influence the recommender's learning. It is not ex-ante obvious how strategic responses would alter a recommender's exploration-exploitation tradeoff.

— Solving Problems of Unknown Difficulty  (2604.00156 - Wu, 31 Mar 2026) in Section 6: Discussion and Future Work